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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2008 blockbuster The Dark Knight, Batman battles the deranged
Joker in a fight for the soul of Gotham. As the movie nears its conclusion,
Batman, through Wayne Enterprises, develops a telephone surveillance
system in order to locate, and eventually stop, the Joker. The system is not
without its detractors, however. Once Batman reveals his invention to Lucius
Fox, the CEO of Wayne Enterprises, Fox declares that the machine is "too
much power for one man" and threatens to resign from his post.1
Nevertheless, Fox eventually agrees to help Batman find the Joker. Once
Batman finds and captures the Joker, Fox destroys the surveillance machine.
The surveillance sequence from the most recent edition of Batman serves
as one of the many illustrations that electronic surveillance is still a popular
topic even though the National Security Agency's (NSA) Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP), in its original form, has not been reauthorized
since January of 2007.2 Although a fictitious example, the surveillance
subplot from The Dark Knight does reveal a variety of the underlying issues
regarding electronic surveillance in the twenty-first century. At a surface
level, the movie sets forth basic arguments for and against this type of
surveillance. The Joker was an extreme threat and the surveillance system
did help Batman catch him.3 As the character of Fox argues, however, the
program represented a serious intrusion on the privacy of the citizens of
Gotham.4 Perhaps on a deeper level, the movie reveals that it is not only the
government, or in this case Batman, that citizens must worry about. After all,
without the help and resources of Wayne Enterprises, Batman's surveillance
would have never been possible. Similarly, the warrantless wiretapping that
occurred as part of the TSP required the assistance of various
telecommunications companies. 5
1 THE DARK KNIGHT (Warner Bros. Pictures 2008).
2 In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Patrick Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales informed
the Senators that "the President has determined not to reauthorize the Terrorist
Surveillance Program when the current authorization expires." Letter from Alberto
Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, to Chairman Patrick Leahy and Senator Arlen Specter
(Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/
20060117gonzalesLetter.pdf [hereinafter Gonzales Letter].
3 THE DARK KNIGHT (Warner Bros. Pictures 2008).
4Id.
5 Eric Lichtblau, Role of Telecom Firms in Wiretaps Is Confirmed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2007, at A13 [hereinafter Lichtblau, Role of Telecom Firms] ("The Bush
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When New York Times reporters James Risen and Eric Lichtblau
uncovered the warrantless surveillance program in December of 2005, the
NSA's wiretapping program faced various forms of political and legal
scrutiny.6 By 2006, both the government and telecommunication companies'
actions were being challenged in federal court.7 With public pressure and
criticism building, President Bush chose not to reauthorize the TSP on
January 17, 2007.8 Furthermore, as Congress attempted to revise the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), the Bush Administration
pushed for Congress to grant immunity to the telecommunications companies
that had participated in the TSP.9
In July 2008, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 Amendment Act of 2008 (FISAAA).' 0 The bill reformed the FISA
system, placing both legislative and judicial checks on federal electronic
surveillance.'" Most notably, the Act created legal immunity for
telecommunications companies. 12 The legislation gives the Attorney General
the authority to "certifly] to the district court" that a person had provided
assistance to the intelligence community during the period of the TSP.13
administration has confirmed for the first time that American telecommunications
companies played a crucial role in the National Security Agency's domestic
eavesdropping program after asserting for more than a year that any role played was a
'state secret."').
6 See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,2005, at Al; see also infra Part II.
7 See, e.g., ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(District Court Judge Anna Diggs Taylor finding the surveillance program
unconstitutional); Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Sues AT&T to
Stop Illegal Surveillance, (Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.eff.org/press/archives/ 2006/01/31
[hereinafter EFF Sues A T&T].
8 See Gonzales Letter, supra note 2.
9 Ellen Nakashima, Roadblock for Telecom Immunity: Senate Judiciary Leaders
Resist Leniency for Surveillance, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2007, at A6.
10 Eric Lichtblau, Senate Approves Bill to Broaden Wiretap Powers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Lichtblau, Senate Approves Bill].
11 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendment Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801) ("An Act [t]o amend
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing
certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence...").
12 Lichtblau, Senate Approves Bill, supra note 10. Opponents of the bill felt that
congressional Democrats had given in to the Bush Administration in passing the bill with
the immunity provision. Id. In particular, President Obama received criticism from
various supporters for deciding to support the legislation after having promised in his
primary campaign to fight new FISA legislation. James Risen, Obama Voters Protest His
Switch on Telecom Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2008, at A14.
13 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2008).
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Upon such a certification, and with limited judicial review, FISAAA then
requires the district court to dismiss the civil action. 14 With Congress passing
the FISA Amendment granting telecommunication immunity, the question
has turned to FISAAA's legitimacy. Telecommunications companies, with
certification from the Attorney General, have moved for dismissal in suits
brought against them for past surveillance activity. 15 Civil liberties groups
have already challenged the statute's constitutional validity in federal court. 16
This Note examines the aftermath of the NSA's Terrorist Surveillance
Program, focusing on the legislation and litigation that has occurred as a
direct result of the program. In particular, the Note unpacks the controversy
surrounding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendment
Act of 2008,17 including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation's (EFF) litigation challenging the 2008 Act.18
Part II of this Note traces the history of the TSP, and the fallout of its media
exposure, leading to the debate over telecommunication immunity. Part III
explores the debates over immunity that eventually led Congress to pass
FISAAA, which included provisions granting telecommunication immunity.
Part IV addresses the litigation challenging the 2008 amendment,
highlighting the arguments against the constitutionality of telecommunication
immunity. Part V highlights the arguments for FISAAA's constitutionality
and ultimately concludes that federal courts should uphold the 2008 FISA
14 Id
15 United States' Notice of Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary
Judgment, In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955
(N.D. Cal. 2009) No. 06-1791 [hereinafter United States' Notice of Motion to Dismiss].
16 Bob Egelko, New Suit on Wiretap Defense, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2008, at B3
("Civil liberties groups started a legal challenge Friday to the new federal law designed to
dismiss their wiretapping suits against telecommunications companies.. .") [hereinafter
Egelko, New Suit].
17 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2008) (providing the requirements for immunity
from civil action for assistance to the intelligence community based on Attorney General
certification).
18 Various plaintiffs, including the ACLU and EFF, have brought civil actions
against a number of telecommunications carriers for assisting the government in the
terrorist surveillance program. Recent Legislation: Congress Grants Telecommunication
Companies Retroactive Immunity from Civil Suits for Complying with NSA Surveillance
Terrorist Program, 122 HARv. L. REv. 1271, 1271 (2009) [hereinafter Recent
Legislation] ("After this information [regarding the TSP] became public, over forty
lawsuits were filed against a number of telecommunications companies for their alleged
role in assisting the TSP; collectively, 'these suits s[ought] hundreds of billions of dollars
in damages."'); see also Egelko, New Suit, supra note 16. The federal court system's
Multi-District Litigation Panel has transferred the cases (approximately forty of them) to
the Northern District of California. Electronic Frontier Foundation, NSA Multi-District
Litigation, http://www.eff.org/cases/att (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
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Amendment as constitutional. Finally, Part VI examines where there is left to
go in the controversy over electronic surveillance and suggests that the time
has come for each side of the debate to count its victories and move forward.
II. THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: A BRIEF BACKGROUND
A. The Story Breaks
"Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the
National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the
United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-
approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying. . . ."19 With
these words the New York Times exposed the TSP that President Bush had
put into effect shortly after September 11, 2001. 20 According to the story,
"[n]early a dozen current and former officials" provided the New York Times
with information regarding the warrantless wiretapping. 21 These sources
estimated that "about 5,000 to 7,000 people suspected of terrorist ties are
monitored at one time .... -"22 The White House had asked the paper not to
publish the article for fear that the publicity would damage the effectiveness
of the program.23
President Bush took little time to respond to the New York Times
article.24 On December 17, 2005, the President delivered a radio address
confirming the existence of the surveillance program. 25 Specifically, the
19 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6, at Al.
20 See Michael C. Miller, Standing in the Wake of the Terrorist Surveillance
Program: A Modified Standard for Challenges to Secret Government Surveillance, 60
RUTGERS L. REv. 1039, 1039 (2008) ("Disclosed to the public by the New York Times in
December of 2005, the TSP was designed to intercept international telephone calls and e-
mail messages coming into and leaving the United States without court oversight.").
21 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6, at Al.
22 Id; see also Jon D. Michaels, All The President's Spies: Private-Public
Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REv. 901, 910 (2008) ("Under
the so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program... the NSA... cumulatively sp[ied] on
millions of Americans' telephone calls and email correspondences.").
23 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6, at Al 6. The New York Times article did concede
that "[s]ome information that administrative officials argued could be useful to terrorists
has been omitted." Id.
24 See Peter Baker, President Says He Ordered NSA Domestic Spying, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 2005, at Al ("President Bush said yesterday that he secretly ordered the
National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans with suspected ties to
terrorists...").
25 The President's Radio Address, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1880, 1881 (Dec.
17, 2005) [hereinafter President's Radio Address].
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President stated, "In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our Nation, I
authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the
Constitution, to intercept the international communications of people with
known links to Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations." 26 In admitting
the existence of the program, President Bush chastised the media and the
government sources that provided information on the program.27 The
President ended his address by emphasizing the effectiveness of the program,
saying, "This authorization is a vital tool in our war against the terrorists. It is
critical to saving American lives."28 Furthermore, throughout the address,
President Bush highlighted the importance in a post-September 11 world of
taking protective measures to thwart terrorism.29
Directly following the announcement of the warrantless surveillance, the
media turned to the role of telecommunications carriers in the program.30 On
December 24, 2005, the New York Times reported, "As part of the
program.., the [NSA] has gained the cooperation of American
telecommunications companies to obtain backdoor access to streams of
domestic and international communications . "31 The NSA used
information that telecommunications companies provided to data mine
information such as phone calls and emails to gain intelligence regarding
26 Id.
27 Id. ("[O]ur enemies have learned information they should not have, and the
unauthorized disclosure of this effort damages our national security and puts our citizens
at risk. Revealing classified information is illegal, alerts our enemies, and endangers our
country.").
28 Id.
29 Id. at 1880-81. Two days after President Bush's radio address, Attorney General
Gonzales held his own press release supplementing the President's message on the
wiretapping program. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, Press Briefing by Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for
National Intelligence, (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html. Gonzales focused on
the "legal underpinnings" of the program, arguing that the program was authorized both
through legislation passed after September 11 and the Constitution. Id. General Michael
Hayden added, "Our purpose here is to detect and prevent attacks. And the program in
this regard has been successful." Id.
3 0 See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials
Report, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 2005, at Al [hereinafter Lichtblau & Risen, Spy Agency
Mined].
31 Id. The article noted that there was a traditional relationship between government
intelligence and communications firms, "[b]ut the N.S.A.'s backdoor access to major
telecommunications switches on American soil with the cooperation of major
corporations represents a significant expansion of the agency's operational
capability ... " Id. The story also stressed that the amount of information harvested by
the program was much greater than originally reported. Id.
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potential terrorists' threats.32 Initially, the Bush administration refused to
comment or provide information on the role of telecommunications
companies in the program. 33 Thus, by late December of 2005, both the TSP
and the assistance of telecommunications companies were in the public
spotlight, opening the door to both judicial and legislative scrutiny.
B. Challenges to the Program: Setting the Stage for the
Telecommunication Immunity Debate
Following the media's disclosure of the TSP, a number of challenges to
the program commenced. In the press, both proponents and opponents of the
TSP were vocal in giving their opinions of the surveillance program.34
Various congressional leaders, from both the Republican and Democratic
Parties, voiced concerns regarding President Bush's actions and the lack of
congressional and judicial oversight of the program. 35 Of particular
importance, civil liberties groups and other concerned parties began
challenging the constitutionality of the TSP in federal courts. 36
1. Taking Warrantless Wiretapping to Court
While the TSP has been challenged in numerous courts, the success of
such challenges has been limited.37 The most successful challenge to date
occurred in the Eastern District of Michigan, where Judge Anna Diggs
32 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, USA
TODAY, May 11, 2006, at Al ("The National Security Agency has been secretly
collecting the phone call records of tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by
AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth .... ).
33 Lichtblau & Risen, Spy Agency Mined, supra note 30, at A12.
34 Compare, e.g., Editorial, Spies, Lies and Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 2006, at
C15 (casting all potential justifications for the wiretapping program as inherently
deceitful), with, e.g., Editorial, Thank You For Wiretapping, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2005,
at A14 ("We're glad Mr. Bush and his team are forcefully defending their entirely legal
and necessary authority to wiretap enemies seeking to kill innocent Americans.").
35 Baker, supra note 24, at A12. Senator Arlen Specter was particularly vocal in his
criticism of the administration, calling the actions "inappropriate" and promising to
conduct hearings into the abuse. Id.
36 See, e.g., ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782; Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra
note 7.
37 Although no case has ultimately held the TSP unconstitutional, or its participants
civilly or criminally liable, multiple challenges to the court are still pending. Electronic
Frontier Foundation, NSA Spying, http://www.eff.org/issues/nsa-spying (outlining EFF's
litigation against the government and telecommunication companies for government
spying).
2009]
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Taylor determined the TSP to be unconstitutional. 38 In American Civil
Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, the plaintiffs, a group of people
who regularly communicated with people from the Middle East regarding
matters such as "journalism, the practice of law, and scholarship," argued
that the TSP violated constitutional speech and privacy rights. 39 In response,
the government claimed that the state secrets doctrine barred the plaintiffs'
suit because any potential suit would require exposure of information
"detrimental to national security."40 Judge Taylor rejected the defendant's
argument,41 and furthermore, found the TSP unconstitutional in violation of
both the First and Fourth Amendments.42 In particular, Judge Taylor held,
"The wiretapping program.., has undisputedly been implemented without
regard to FISA and.., has undisputedly violated the Fourth in failing to
procure judicial orders as required by FISA, and accordingly has violated the
First Amendment Rights of these Plaintiffs as well."'43 Because of her ruling
on the TSP's constitutionality, Judge Taylor granted the plaintiffs' request
for injunction.44
38 See ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
39 Id. at 758.
40 Id. at 758-59. The state secrets doctrine is an evidentiary rule preventing
disclosure of information that may harm the United States' national security interests. Id.
at 759. The state secrets doctrine played a large role in the Bush Administration and
Justice Department's defenses to a variety of national security related civil claims. Robert
M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1249, 1250-51, 1308 (2007) (arguing that the Bush Administration's use of the
state secrets doctrine, while pervasive, did "not depart significantly from its past usage").
41 ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 765. The court found that the state secrets defense did
apply to the plaintiff's data mining claim. Id. Nevertheless, the court rejected the state
secrets argument with regard to the TSP, finding that plaintiffs had a "prima facie case
based solely on Defendants' public admissions regarding the TSP." Id.
42 Id. at 782. Unsurprisingly, Democrats and civil liberties organizations applauded
Judge Taylor's ruling, while the Bush Administration and fellow Republicans denounced
the opinion as a product of a liberal judge. Adam Liptak & Eric Lichtblau, US. Judge
Finds Wiretap Actions Violate the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at Al. Attorney
General Gonzales stated following the decision, "[administration officials] believe very
strongly that the program is lawful .... We're going to do everything we can do in the
courts to allow this program to continue." Id
43 ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 775-76. Furthermore, Judge Taylor also found that the
surveillance program violated statutory law and the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at
782.
44 Id. ("For all of the reasons outlined above, this court ... holds that the TSP
violates the [Administrative Procedure Act]; the Separation of Powers doctrine; the First
and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and the statutory law... The
Permanent Injunction of the TSP requested by Plaintiffs is granted .... ").
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The victory for opponents of the TSP was short-lived, however. The
Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded Judge Taylor's ruling, finding that the
plaintiffs did not have standing for their claims. 45 In reaching this
determination, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' claims lacked the
component of injury.46 Judge Alice M. Batchelder explained, "[T]he injury
that would support a declaratory judgment action (i.e., the anticipated
interception of communications resulting in harm to the contacts) is too
speculative, and the injury that is imminent and concrete (i.e., the burden on
professional performance) does not support a declaratory judgment action."47
In explaining why each claim lacked standing, the court took issue with the
causation element and held the state secrets doctrine was applicable to certain
claims.48 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on February 19, 2008. 49
Although there have been other direct challenges to government
actions,50 civil liberty organizations and other plaintiffs have also challenged
the cooperative actions of telecommunications carriers involved with the
TSP.51 On January 31, 2006, the EFF began a class action lawsuit against
45 ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Because we
cannot find that any of the plaintiffs have standing for any of their claims, we must vacate
the district court's order and remand for dismissal of the entire action.").
4 6 Id. at 657; see also Amy Goldstein, Lawsuit Against Wiretaps Rejected, WASH.
POST, July 7, 2007, at A5 ("Judge Alice M. Batchelder... concluded that the
plaintiffs.., do not have the legal standing to bring the lawsuit. She said the plaintiffs
could not show that they had been injured directly by the surveillance.").
4 7 ACLU, 493 F.3d at 657.
48 For the First Amendment cause of action, the Sixth Circuit found a lack of
causation between the government action and the injuries claimed. Id. at 670 ("The
plaintiffs have not shown a sufficient causal connection between the complained-of
conduct (i.e., the absence of a warrant or FISA protection) and the alleged harm (i.e., the
inability to communicate)."). The court found a lack of standing for the Fourth
Amendment claim because the state secrets doctrine prevented the plaintiffs from
presenting any evidence that their communications were actually intercepted. Id. at 673
("The plaintiffs do not, and cannot, assert that any of their own communications have
ever been intercepted. Instead, they allege only a belief that their communications are
being intercepted. .. .") Finally, with regard to the separation of powers doctrine, the
court determined that the record "does not permit the kind of particularized analysis that
is required to determine causation." Id. at 674.
49 ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 128 S. Ct. 1334, 1334 (2008).
50 See, e.g., AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th
Cir. 2007) (finding that absent sealed documents, that were protected under the state
secrets doctrine, the plaintiff could not establish standing unless FISA preempted the
state secrets doctrine).
51 Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 37.
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AT&T for assisting the NSA in the wiretapping program. 52 AT&T moved for
dismissal based on a lack of standing, and the United States, moving to
intervene as a defendant, also sought dismissal. 53 Judge Walker of the
Northern District of California rejected dismissing the case under the state
secrets doctrine, stating, "If the government's public disclosures have been
truthful, revealing whether AT&T has received a certification to assist in
monitoring communication content should not reveal any new
information .... [I]f the government has not been truthful, the state secrets
privilege should not serve as a shield .... ,,54 AT&T appealed Judge
Walker's decision to the Ninth Circuit; however, the Ninth Circuit remanded
the case in light of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008. 55
A number of other civil actions, in addition to Hepting v. AT&T Corp.,
were filed against telecommunications companies in May 2006.56 On the
authority of the Multi-District Litigation Panel of the federal court,
approximately forty cases regarding telecommunications companies and
NSA surveillance were transferred to the Northern District of California. 57
The ACLU and the EFF are joint counsel in the multi-jurisdiction
telecommunications lawsuits. 58 Nevertheless, because of congressional
action, such lawsuits are in jeopardy. 59 Judge Walker, in June of 2009,
granted the government's motion to dismiss the suits.60 The ACLU and EFF
are planning to appeal this decision to the Ninth Circuit.61 Therefore, to fully
52 Id. ("The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed a class-action lawsuit against
AT&T Tuesday, accusing the telecom giant of violating the law and the privacy of its
customers by collaborating with the National Security Agency (NSA) in its massive and
illegal program to wiretap and data-mine Americans' communications.").
53 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
54 Id. at 996. Judge Walker did recognize the possibility that the defendants would
appeal, and therefore, had the court certify the order so that the parties could apply for
immediate appeal. Id. at 1011.
55 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). For more
information on FISAAA, see infra Part III.
56 Electronic Frontier Foundation, supra note 18.
57 Id. In addition to AT&T Corp., telecommunications defendants include Verizon
Communications, BellSouth, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, Comcast, and Cingular Wireless.
Id.; see also Cauley, supra note 32, at AI.
58 Egelko, New Suit, supra note 16, at B3.
59 See infra Part III.
60 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
61 Press Release, EFF and ACLU Planning to Appeal Dismissal of Dozens of
Spying Cases, Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 3, 2009,
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unravel the story of telecommunications litigation, one must further explore
the buildup to the FISA Amendment Act of 2008.
2. The Surveillance Program Ends;
the Telecommunication Immunity Debate Begins
On January 17, 2007, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales sent a letter to
Chairman Patrick Leahy and ranking minority member Arlen Specter of the
Senate Committee of the Judiciary. 62 In the letter, the Attorney General
notified the Senators that President Bush had decided not to reauthorize the
TSP.6 3 The letter emphasized that the Administration had begun, even before
public disclosure of the program, to explore options for FISA court
approval.64 According to the letter, on January 10, a judge of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court issued orders allowing the government to
target communications when probable cause exists to believe that one of the
communicates belongs to a recognized terrorist organization. 65 With this
order in place, President Bush felt that reauthorization of the TSP was no
longer necessary. 66
With the TSP coming to an end, the debate over telecommunication
immunity began to accelerate. Although the New York Times and other media
outlets had already discussed the role of telecommunications in the
surveillance program shortly after initial disclosure of the program,67 it was
not until August of 2007 that the Bush Administration confirmed the role of
http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/06/03 [hereinafter EFF and ACLU Planning to
Appeal].
62 Gonzales Letter, supra note 2; Austin Anderson, The Terrorist Surveillance
Program: Assessing the Legality of the Unknown, 3 US: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y
387, 388 (2007).
63 Gonzales Letter, supra note 2.
64 Id. ("In the spring of 2005-well before the first press account disclosing the
existence of the [TSP]-the Administration began exploring options for seeking such
FISA Court approval."). Despite the decision to end the program and seek court approval,
controversy still existed due to the Bush Administration's refusal to provide a detailed
account regarding the TSP. Caitlin Thistle, A First Amendment Breach: The National
Security Agency's Electronic Surveillance Program, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 1197, 1199
(2008).
65 Gonzales Letter, supra note 2.
66 Despite effectively ending the TSP, the Attorney General's office still ardently
maintained that "the Terrorist Surveillance Program fully complies with the law." Id.
67 See Katherine Shrader, Spy Chief Reveals Classified Details, S.F. GATE, August
22, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/n/a/2007/08/22/national/
w 130303D94.DTL (discussing how McConnell revealed telecommunications companies'
role in FISA and his argument for telecommunication immunity).
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telecommunications industry in the TSP. 68 Specifically, Mike McConnell,
the Director of National Intelligence, stated, "Under the president's program,
the terrorist surveillance program, the private sector had assisted us, because
if you're going to get access, you've got to have a partner." 69 Hand in hand
with this admission came a call from the Bush Administration for legal
immunity for the telecommunications companies involved. 70 Additionally,
McConnell's statements came at the same time Congress was threatening to
rework legislation regarding the government's surveillance authority and
considering the issue of telecommunication immunity. 71
With the TSP terminated, the telecommunications litigation already in
progress, and the government admitting the role of telecommunications
companies in the program, by midyear 2007 the stage was set for the
congressional debate on telecommunications immunity and FISA law.
Nevertheless, with forces such as the Bush Administration and civil liberties
organizations applying considerable pressure, the issue of retroactive
immunity was clearly divisive in Congress's attempt to revise the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
III. AMENDING FISA: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS IMMUNITY DEBATE
Understanding the FISA Amendment requires first understanding the
context in which the legislation took place. Reaching FISAAA, which
included telecommunication immunity, required a long political battle and a
great deal of compromise. 72 Even after a drawn out legislative process, many
68 Lichtblau, Role of Telecom Firms, supra note 5, at A13.
69 Id. This statement was made in an interview to the El Paso Times. Shrader, supra
note 67.
70 Lichtblau, Role of Telecom Firms, supra note 5, at A13. In the same interview,
McConnell emphasized the importance of granting retroactive immunity to
telecommunications companies. Id. McConnell justified the immunity in part to protect
the financial well-being of the telecommunications companies, saying, "If you play out
the suits at the value they're claimed ... it would bankrupt these companies." Id.
71 Shrader, supra note 67. Congress had already legislated to give the President
broader wiretapping authority (in comparison to the original FISA authority) and to give
telecommunications companies some immunity in helping the government with
surveillance, but this immunity was not retroactive. Lichtblau, Role of Telecom Firms,
supra note 5, at A 13. Congressional Democrats in the summer of 2007 were threatening
to rework the new legislation because they felt it gave the Executive branch too much
power. Id.
72 Eric Lichtblau & David Stout, House Passes Bill on Federal Wiretapping Powers,
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/2 1/washington/
21fisacnd.html. The New York Times reported, "The House on Friday overwhelmingly
approved a bill overhauling the rules on the government's wiretapping powers and
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were still unsatisfied that telecommunication immunity became law.73
Examining the passage of the 2008 Amendment begins by looking back at
FISA law in its original form. After examining the FISA Act of 1978, one
can turn to the debate that occurred after public discovery of the TSP.
Finally, engaging the legislative amendment itself sets the scene for the
judicial battles that the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 has created.
A. Past Abuses and the Passage of the FISA Act of 1978
In December of 1974, Seymour Hersh of the New York Times published
an article accusing the Central Intelligence Agency of domestic spying.74 The
response to Hersh's article was substantial, as both houses of Congress
established committees to investigate governmental abuse under the
leadership of Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis Pike. 75 The
Church Committee's results were profound. 76 Specifically, in 1976 the
Committee concluded that since 1956, the government had "conducted a
sophisticated vigilante operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of
First Amendment rights of speech and association." 77 With such a scathing
conclusion, the Church Committee paved the way for legislative action.
conferring what amounts to legal immunity to the telephone companies." Id.
Nevertheless, "[t]he vote followed months of wrangling and came a day after Democratic
and Republican leaders reached agreement." Id.
73 Representative Nadler of New York claimed the amendment "abandons the
Constitution's protections and insulates lawless behavior from legal scrutiny." Id.
74 Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in US. Against Anti- War
Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at Al; see also
Gerald K. Haines, Looking for a Rogue Elephant: The Pike Committee Investigations and
the CIA, at 81, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-
csi/pdf/v42i5a07p.pdf (providing a historical account of congressional investigations into
government agencies following the media's discovery of domestic spying). There are
strong similarities between the settings of Hersh's article and Risen's story uncovering
the TSP thirty years later. Compare Hersh, supra, at Al, with Risen & Lichtblau, supra
note 6, at Al.
75 Haines, supra note 74, at 81. The two committees did play different roles, with
the Church Committee focusing on the domestic spying allegations. Id. ("While the
Church Committee centered its attention on the more sensational charges of illegal
activities by the CIA and other components of the IC, the Pike Committee set about
examining the CIA's effectiveness and its costs to taxpayers.").
76 See Diane Carraway Piette & Jesselyn Radack, Piercing the "Historical Mists
The People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of the "Wall," 17
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 437, 441-42 (2006) ("[T]he comprehensive 1976 Church
Committee Report, with its shocking revelations of surveillance programs targeting
American citizens ... had a chilling effect on warrantless electronic wiretaps.").
77 1d. at 441 n.22 (quoting staff reports from the Church Committee).
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In light of the Church Committee report, Congress took decisive action
to pass an electronic surveillance bill. Bill proposals were introduced in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 18, 1978, regarding
potential electronic surveillance law. 78 Each House passed Senate Bill 1566,
which eventually became the FISA law, by substantial margins.79 President
Carter signed the Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978 into law on October 25,
1978.80 Through passing FISA, Congress attempted to assure the public and
resolve disputes over the proper governmental role in domestic surveillance
by establishing a system of checks on the Executive. 81
The FISA law of 1978 provides for numerous checks on the Executive's
electronic surveillance power.82 Specifically, FISA requires the President and
the Attorney General to apply to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
for approval of surveillance.8 3 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
consists of eleven judges whom the Supreme Court Chief Justice chooses to
designate.84 In deciding whether to grant an order, judges determine whether
there is probable cause to permit surveillance.85 In addition to judicial checks
on electronic surveillance, FISA also requires the executive branch to
provide information to Congress regarding targets. 86
For approximately thirty years the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 seemed to be an acceptable solution to the issue of electronic
surveillance. 87 Nevertheless, once Risen broke the story of President Bush's
domestic wiretapping, the surveillance debate began anew. Although revising
FISA required Congress to examine various concerns, the major issue
78 See S. 1566, 95th Cong. (1978) (enacted).
79 Id. (the Senate passed the bill by a vote of ninety-five-to-one).
8 0 See id.
81 Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REv. 101, 158 (2008). The White
House had claimed that for reasons of "national security" ordinary Fourth Amendment
analysis did not apply in this area. Id.
82 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000).
83 Id. § 1802(b) ("Applications for a court order under this subchapter are authorized
if the President has... empowered the Attorney General to approve applications to the
court... and a judge to whom an application is made may, notwithstanding any other
law, grant an order.").
84 Id. § 1803.
85 Id. § 1805. The statute sets forth standards for determining probable cause
including whether the person under investigation is an agent of a foreign power. Id.
86 Id. § 1803(a)(3).
87 Rubenfeld, supra note 81, at 159. Two circuit courts upheld FISA's
constitutionality in this period, and the Supreme Court never addressed FISA directly.
Id.; see also United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73 (2d Cir. 1984).
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quickly became whether Congress should grant telecommunication
immunity.
B. Congressional Debate over FISA and Telecommunications
Immunity
1. The Protect America Act and President Bush's Call for Telecom
Immunity
Even before the Bush Administration had publicly admitted the role of
telecommunications companies in the TSP, Congress was working to come
up with a twenty-first century solution to the electronic surveillance debate.88
On August 5, 2007, President Bush signed the Protect America Act into law,
which gave broad wiretapping power to the Bush Administration. 89 In
particular, the law gave the NSA the power to bypass the FISA court system
in conducting electronic surveillance. 90 Additionally, the Protect America
Act foreshadowed the telecommunication immunity debate to come, as the
law "require[d] telecommunications companies to make their facilities
available for government wiretaps, and it grant[ed] them immunity from
lawsuits for complying." 91 Nevertheless, the legislation was by no means a
permanent solution to the FISA debate as the Protect America Act expired in
February of 2008.92
As noted above, in August 2007, the Bush Administration revealed the
role telecommunications companies played in the TSP and began the push
88 Shrader, supra note 67; Charlie Savage, New Law Expands Power to Wiretap
Diminishes Oversight of the NSA Spy Program, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
89 Savage, supra note 88, at Al. ("[T]he law grants the executive branch even
broader warrantless wiretapping powers than the ones Bush said he had a right to exercise
under his original program.")
90 See Juan P. Valdivieso, Recent Developments: Protect America Act of 2007, 45
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 581, 583 (2008) ("By changing the definition of 'electronic
surveillance,' the [Protect America Act] removed conduct that would have met the
defmition of electronic surveillance under the previous version of FISA from the
jurisdiction of the FISA Court."). The bill outraged many on the left, particularly civil
liberties groups, who "claim[ed] that it gave the government unconstitutionally broad
powers to spy on Americans who have no involvement in terrorist activity." Id. at 581.
91 Savage, supra note 88, at A5. It is important to note that this immunity grant was
not retroactive and did not apply to prior participants in the TSP. See id.
92 All Things Considered: What Happens If the Protect America Act Expires? (NPR
radio broadcast Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=19055475 (President Bush fought to make the bill permanent and
claimed that not doing so was dangerous for the country).
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for retroactive immunity.93 With lawmakers looking to revise the Protect
America Act, President Bush renewed his call for telecommunication
immunity in October of 2007. 94 President Bush urged that any legislation
passed must include telecommunication immunity. 95  The President
consistently applied pressure for telecommunication immunity throughout
the congressional process and threatened to veto any bill on FISA that did not
grant telecommunication immunity. 96
2. The Telecommunication Immunity Debate in Congress and the
Passage of the FISA Amendment Act of2008
The debate over telecommunication immunity revealed a deep divide in
Congress, and especially, among congressional Democrats. 97 The Senate was
the first to take legislative action on telecommunication immunity. 98 On
February 12, 2008, the Senate passed a bill that would have amended FISA
law and granted telecommunication immunity to the companies that had
participated in the TSP.99 Although the final vote on the bill was a
convincing 68-to-29, Democratic leaders did introduce a series of
amendments to attempt to strip the bill of telecommunication immunity.00
Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut was particularly ardent in his
93 Shrader, supra note 67; see supra Part II.B.2.
94 Bush Pushes for Telecom Immunity, USA TODAY, Oct. 10, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-10-10-bush-eavesdroppingN.htm.
95 Id. President Bush emphasized that the new bill, with retroactive
telecommunication immunity, was needed to "keep the intelligence gap firmly closed."
Id.
96 Bush Again Demands Telecom Immunity, CBS NEWS, Feb. 23, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/23/national/main3868291.shtml ("President
Bush has made it known repeatedly that, while he demands an update to FISA in order to
ensure national security, he also will not sign any law that does not grant protection from
lawsuits to the telecoms.").
97 See, e.g., Martin Kady II, Dems Fall Well Short of Stripping Immunity From Spy
Bill, CBS NEWS, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/12/politics/
politico/thecrypt/main3821504.shtml.
98 Eric Lichtblau, Senate Passes Bill to Expand US. Spying Powers, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/12/washington/12cnd-fisa.html
[hereinafter Lichtblau, Senate Passes Bill].
99 Id. The Senate bill also would have broadened the executive branch's surveillance
powers, allowing intelligence agencies procedures for bypassing court orders. Id.
100 154 CONG. REC. S775 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2008) (Senate consideration of a series
of amendments to Senate bill 2248 to amend FISA law); see also Lichtblau, Senate
Passes Bill, supra note 98.
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opposition to telecom immunity.10' On the Senate floor Dodd argued the
grand implications of the immunity decision:
Much more than a few companies and a few lawsuits are at stake.
Equal justice is at stake-justice that does not place some corporations
outside of the rule of law. Openness is at stake-an open debate on security
and liberty, and an end to warrantless wiretapping of Americans.10 2
Others who opposed immunity included presidential contenders Barack
Obama and Hillary Clinton. 103
The idea of granting telecommunication immunity was not well received
in the House of Representatives, however. In March 2008 the House passed
its own attempt at amending FISA, refusing to grant telecommunication
immunity. 104 Instead of granting immunity, the House's bill "would send the
issue to a secure federal court and give the companies the right to argue their
case using information the administration has deemed to be state secrets." 10 5
Because of the sharp division between the House bill and Bush's call for
telecommunication immunity, many representatives doubted whether an
amendment would even be passed during Bush's presidency. 10 6 The end vote
tally revealed how deeply divided the House was on the measure, with a final
vote of 213-to-197.107
101 See 154 CONG. REC. S840-41 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 2008) (statement of Sen. Dodd)
(hereinafter Senate debate). Dodd spoke on the Senate floor in opposition of the bill for
over twenty hours; see also Lichtblau, Senate Passes Bill, supra note 98.
102 Senate debate, supra note 101, at S840. He also stressed the importance of
judicial scrutiny in the electronic surveillance process. Id. at S841 ("There is only one
way to settle the issue at stake today. Not simply on trust, not the opinion of a handful of
individuals-as much as we may admire or like them-but in our courts.").
103 Kady, supra note 97. Senator Obama would later change his position on
telecommunication immunity, drawing the ire of many of his supporters. Risen, supra
note 12, at A14 ("In recent days, more than 7,000 Obama supporters have organized on a
social networking site on Mr. Obama's own campaign Web site. They are calling on Mr.
Obama to reverse his decision...")
104 Jonathan Weisman, House Passes a Surveillance Bill Not to Bush's Liking,
WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2008, at A2.
105 Id. EFF attorney Kevin Bankston commended the House's approach, stating,
"We applaud the House for refusing to grant amnesty to lawbreaking telecoms, and for
passing a bill that would allow our lawsuit against AT&T to proceed fairly and securely."
Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Applauds House Passage of
Surveillance Bill with No Telecom Immunity (Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.eff.org/
press/archives/ 2008/03/14.
106 Weisman, supra note 104, at A2. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid called on
the Bush Administration to begin a process of compromise on the issue. Id.
107 Id.
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Despite House pessimism regarding the passage of a FISA amendment,
by the summer of 2008, Congress had reached a compromise. 10 8 In June of
2008, facing continued pressure from the White House, House Democratic
leaders negotiated with Republicans to draft a new form of the FISA
Amendment. 109 In exchange for granting telecommunication immunity,
House Democrats required the inspectors general of multiple intelligence
agencies to review the program and also emphasized in the bill that FISA
was the exclusive way for the executive to conduct wiretapping
surveillance. 10 Many representatives celebrated the compromise, including
Michael Arcuri of New York, who touted the legislation as a "bipartisan
FISA bill that will help protect our Nation from terrorism, while protecting
the civil liberties we, as Americans, hold dear."' I Others, however, found
the "compromise" bill lacking."12 Representative McGovern of Maryland
opposed the bill because it contained "immunity for telecom companies that
may have participated in President Bush's illegal surveillance" and "fail[ed]
to adequately protect the privacy rights of law abiding, innocent American
citizens." 113 Despite a sharply divided Democratic party, the House passed
the bill with a vote total of 293-to-129. 114
With the House's passage of the FISA amendment, the last major hurdle
was cleared. In July of 2008, with a vote once again of 68-to-29, the Senate
approved the FISA Amendment Act of 2008.'15 President Bush signed the
108 Lichtblau & Stout, supra note 72.
109 New Wiretap Bill Would Shield Phone Companies: Key Democrats, Republicans
Reach Compromise on Security, Privacy, MSNBC, June 19, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25265879/.
110 Lichtblau & Stout, supra note 72. House Majority Leader Hoyer delivered
tempered praise for the bill, stating, "It is the result of compromise, and like any
compromise is not perfect, but I believe it strikes a sound balance." Id.
111 154 CONG. REc. H5739 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. Arcuri). The
New York Democrat did not think that "the FISA agreement [was] perfect," but at the
same time noted that "[e]ffective legislation demands bipartisan consensus." Id.
112 See, e.g., 154 CoNG. REC. H5740 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep.
McGovem); Lichtblau & Stout, supra note 72.
113 154 CONG. REC. H5740 (daily ed. June 20, 2008) (statement of Rep. McGovern).
Representative McGovern also took issue with the lag period (seven days) between which
the bill allows electronic surveillance to begin before judicial review commences. Id. at
H5740-41.
114 Lichtblau & Stout, supra note 72. While only one Republican voted against the
bill, House Democrats were clearly divided as 105 voted for the bill and 128 voted
against. Id. In opposing the amendment, the New York Times reported that Representative
Nadler of New York "called the bill 'a fig leaf... [that] abandons the Constitution's
protections and insulates lawless behavior from legal scrutiny."' Id.
115 Lichtblau, Senate Approves Bill, supra note 10, at Al.
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law quickly calling its passage "long overdue." 116 Thus, the FISA
Amendment Act of 2008 became law, granting telecommunication immunity
to the companies that assisted in the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
C. The FISA Amendment Act of2008
What then did the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 actually do? Besides
granting telecommunication immunity, FISAAA provided the largest update
to electronic surveillance law since the original FISA Act of 1978 was
passed. 117 Among other adjustments, the Amendment establishes a new
process for the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to
obtain authorization for electronic surveillance of foreign targets. 118
Specifically, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence may
conduct electronic surveillance on targets outside the United States for up to
one year, subject to a variety of limitations.19
Additionally, FISAAA creates (and re-established) safeguards for civil
liberties. Judicial and congressional oversight of electronic surveillance is a
clear emphasis of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008.120 FISAAA establishes
new procedures for submitting applications for surveillance to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court.121 The federal officer initiating the
surveillance is required to present a detailed application for certification to
the court justifying the need for electronic surveillance.12 2 FISAAA also
requires congressional oversight, in the form of semi-annual reports from the
116 Id. Eric Lichtblau of the New York Times described the law as "handing
President Bush one more victory in a series of hard-fought clashes with Democrats over
national security issues." Id.
118 See 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1881a, 1881b, 1881f (West 2008).
119 Id. § 1881a. The key limitation on electronic surveillance comes in the form of
judicial review through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts. Id. Other limitations
include the prohibition of targeting people "known at the time of acquisition to be located
in the United States." Id.
120 See id. §§ 1881b, 1881f.
121 See id. § 1881b ("The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court shall have
jurisdiction to review an application and to enter an order approving the targeting of a
United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to
acquire foreign intelligence information ....").
122 50 U.S.C.A. § 188lb(b) (West 2008). The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, after reviewing the application then makes a determination whether there is
probable cause to believe that the target is outside the United States, and also determines
whether the application meets the FISA law limitations. Id. § 188 lb(c).
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Attorney General regarding electronic surveillance.123  Finally, the
Amendment contains a message that FISA is the exclusive means of
conducting federal electronic surveillance. 124 This provision, one of the key
compromises that the Democrats gained through the legislative process,
states that, "this chapter shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic
communications may be conducted."' 125
The most important accomplishment, for the present discussion, of the
Amendment was the creation of a system of telecommunication immunity.126
FISAAA's telecommunication immunity provision establishes a system for
the Attorney General to certify to United States district courts that a person
or entity provided assistance with electronic surveillance. 127 Once the
Attorney General grants such certification, the district court is required to
dismiss the action, subject to limited judicial review. 128 The Attorney
General has a number of potential justifications for certification. 129 First, the
Attorney General may certify a company for telecommunication immunity if
the company's assistance was pursuant to a court order. 130 Second, the
Attorney General may provide certification if a company was cooperating
with foreign surveillance law. 131 The Attorney General may also certify that
a defendant did not provide the assistance alleged. 132 Finally, the FISA
Amendment Act of 2008 allows the Attomey General to grant certification to
telecommunication companies that assisted the President "beginning on
September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007 .... 133
123 1d. § 1881f (requiring the Attorney General "fully inform" congressional
intelligence and judiciary committees of electronic surveillance matters every six
months).
12 4 1d. § 1812.
125 Id.
126 1d. § 1885a.
127 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(a) (West 2008).
128 Id. § 1885a(a) ("[A] civil action may not lie or be maintained in a Federal or
State court against any person for providing assistance to an element of the intelligence
community, and shall be promptly dismissed, if the Attorney General certifies to the
district court...").
12 9 Id. § 1885a(a)(1)-(5).
13 0 Id. § 1885(a)(1).
131 Id. § 1885(a)(2)-(3).
132 1d. § 1885(a)(5).
133 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(a)(4)(A)(i) (West 2008). In order to receive such immunity,
a service provider must have been acting subject to a written request from a head of the
intelligence community and must have been assisting in an effort "designed to detect or
prevent a terrorist attack." Id.
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Once the Attorney General has provided certification to the district court,
there remains a process of judicial review.134 Specifically, a district court
must dismiss a case following Attorney General certification "unless the
court finds that such certification is not supported by substantial evidence
provided to the court." 135 In reaching such a determination, the court is
allowed to review any "court order, certification, written request, or
directive" regarding the certification. 136 Nevertheless, there are limits on
government disclosure. 137 If the Attorney General declares that disclosure of
documents "would harm the national security of the United States" the court
will review such information "in camera and ex parte."' 138
Empowered with the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, and the procedures
the Amendment created, telecommunication companies that had assisted in
the TSP could move to dismiss any lawsuits brought against them. Because
the executive and legislative branches have already committed to the
Amendment, opponents of telecommunication immunity have been left with
only one branch of government to turn to: the judiciary.
IV. LITIGATION DEVELOPMENT: CHALLENGING THE 2008 FISA
AMENDMENT ACT
The FISA Amendment Act of 2008 shifted the focus of the civil liberty
organizations' lawsuits against telecommunication companies. At the time of
the amendment, the case had moved to the Ninth Circuit on appeal from the
Northern District of California. 139 Because of FISAAA, the Ninth Circuit
decided to remand the case to the Northern District of California for further
proceedings.140
On September 19, 2008, the United States filed a notice with the
Northern District of California informing the court that it would move to
dismiss the case when the court convened on December 2, 2008.141 The basis
134 See Id. § 1885a(b).
13 5 Id. § 1885a(b)(1).
13 6 Id. § 1885a(b)(2).
137 See Id. § 1885a(c).
138 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(c) (West 2008).
139 See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2006); see
also Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008). Judge Walker of the
Northern District of California had decided not to dismiss the case based on the
government and defendant's motion regarding the state secrets doctrine. Hepting,
439 F. Supp. at 996.
140 539 F.3d at 1157 ("In light of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008... we remand
this case to the district court. We retain jurisdiction over any further appeals.").
141 United States' Notice of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 15, at 2.
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for the government's motion to dismiss was the 2008 FISA Amendment
Act's grant of telecommunication immunity.142 Specifically, the government
argued that because Attorney General Michael B. Mukaskey submitted a
public certification that the claims against the telecommunications carriers
fell within the circumstances defined under FISAAA the court should
dismiss the civil actions. 143 Furthermore, the government argued that under
FISAAA, the Attorney General did not have to reveal his basis for
certification because disclosure "would cause exceptional harm to national
security."' 44
On October 16, 2008, the ACLU and EFF filed a brief with Judge
Walker opposing the United States' motion to dismiss.145 In the brief, the
plaintiffs argue that the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 was unconstitutional
and therefore could not be used by the court to dismiss claims against
telecommunication carriers. 146 The argument for unconstitutionality has three
basic strains. 147 First, the ACLU and EFF argue that Congress cannot
14 2 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2008) (laying out procedures for implementing
the statutory immunity defense).
143 United States' Notice of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 15, at 2-3, 12-14. A
critical part of the government's argument was that there was substantial evidence to
support the Attorney General's decision. Id. As noted above, the FISA Amendment states
that a court shall not give the immunity provision effect if the "court finds that such
certification is not supported by substantial evidence." 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(b)(1). In the
notice, the government argued that the court should treat substantial evidence as highly
deferential. United States' Notice of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 15, at 14 (quoting Pal
v. INS, 204 F.3d 935, 937 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We review determinations of the BIA
under the highly deferential standard of substantial evidence.")).
144 United States' Notice of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 141, at 15. The FISAAA
provides, "If the Attorney General files a declaration... that disclosure ... would harm
the national security of the United States, the court shall (1) review such
certification... and (2) limit any public disclosure concerning such certification ..." 50
U.S.C.A. § 1885a(c).
145 Egelko, New Suit, supra note 16, at B3.
146 Corrected MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion of the United States Seeking to
Apply 50 U.S.C. § 1885a to Dismiss These Actions at ii-iii, In re Nat'l Sec. Agency
Telecomms. Records Litig., No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2008)
[hereinafter MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition]. The plaintiffs also argue in the alternative that
the Attorney General has not met his burden of substantial evidence, but the focus of the
brief was the Constitutional arguments. See id. at 36. Additionally, the plaintiffs claim
that the secrecy provision in 50 U.S.C. 1885a violates the First Amendment and Article
III. Id. at 31; see also Egelko, New Suit, supra note 16, at B3 ("Civil liberties
groups... [say] the statute violates phone customers' constitutional rights and tramples
on judicial authority.").
147 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146 at ii-iii; MDL Plaintiffs' Reply to
Briefs of the Carriers and of the United States Seeking to Apply 50 U.S.C. § 1885a to
Dismiss These Actions at ii, In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig. No.
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eliminate the plaintiffs' constitutional causes of action under the First and
Fourth Amendments. 148  Second, the plaintiffs contend that the
telecommunication immunities statute violates the separation of powers.149
Finally, the plaintiffs assert that the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 violates
the Due Process Clause. 150
A. Elimination of Plaintiffs 'First and Fourth Amendment Claims
One potential argument against telecommunications immunity alleges
that the Attorney General, under FISAAA's approach to immunity,
unconstitutionally "den[ies] plaintiffs any judicial remedy whatsoever... for
their constitutional claims of First and Fourth Amendment violations."' 51
The argument stems from the notion in Marbury v. Madison that the
judiciary serves the role of placing constitutional limits on the other two
branches of government. 152 The Supreme Court has explicitly allowed
plaintiffs to recover damages for First and Fourth Amendment violations. 153
If the Executive and Congress are able to abolish avenues of judicial relief,
then the judiciary will not be able to perform its critical review function. 154
Among the avenues of relief that must be protected are the First and Fourth
Amendments to the Constitution. 155
M:06-cv-01791-VRW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter MDL Plaintiffs' Reply
Briefs].
148 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 2 (quoting Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).
149 Id. at 13; MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 7-16.
150 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 22.
151 Id. at 2-3.
152 Id. at 3 (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-78).
153 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971) ("Having concluded that petitioner's complaint states a cause of action
under the Fourth Amendment, we hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money
damages for any injuries he has suffered .. ") (citations omitted); Hartman v. Moore,
547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2, 256 (2006) (allowing remedy for First Amendment claims under
the Bivens approach).
154 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 3 ("As Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion in Marbury explains, the necessity of a judicial remedy for invasions of
individual rights flows inexorably from the Judiciary's essential constitutional function in
enforcing the constitutional limitations that circumscribe the actions of the Executive and
the Legislature.") (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176-78).
155 Id. ("Because of the rule of judicial redressability of constitutional violations,
federal courts have the power to grant equitable relief for violations of these
constitutional rights.").
2009] 1237
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
The plaintiffs in the telecommunication immunity case point out that
when Congress or the Executive has attempted to bypass the Judiciary, the
court system has taken action. 156 The brief opposing dismissal states, "When,
however, Congress and the Executive have left open no path for adequate
judicial review of constitutional claims, the Court has not hesitated to strike
down the obstructions to judicial review the political branches have
erected."' 157 To support this idea the plaintiffs cite the case of Boumediene v.
Bush.158 In Boumediene, the Supreme Court was faced with two acts of
Congress denying habeas corpus review to detainees at Guantanamo Bay. 159
The Court in Boumediene held that the detainees were entitled to habeas
corpus, reasoning, "If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the
detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the
requirements of the Suspension Clause." 160
Underlying the argument that telecommunication immunity eliminates
First and Fourth Amendment claims is a more general statement regarding
surveillance. 161 Specifically, opponents of telecommunication immunity are
likely to believe that surveillance systems, and those who assist such
systems, require an unbiased arbitrator to check their power.162 Plaintiffs
opposing the telecommunications industry have argued that
telecommunication immunity in combination with general FISA laws
"grant[] the Executive the power to compel dismissal of constitutional claims
without any judicial determination, either before or after the surveillance, of
the facts as to what surveillance is actually occurring or of the
constitutionality of the surveillance." 163 Additionally, plaintiffs supported
156 See id. at 5; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding
that prisoners at Guantanamo Bay cannot be denied habeas corpus without invoking the
Suspension Clause).
157 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 5.
158 Id. (citing Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262).
159 128 S. Ct. at 2240. The Court was specifically dealing with aliens, designated as
enemy combatants, challenging the constitutionality of the Military Commission Act and
the Detainee Treatment Act. Id.; see also MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146 at
5.
160 128 S. Ct. at 2262. In reaching this determination, the Court found that Congress
did not intend the Detainee Treatment Act to replace habeas corpus procedure. Id. at
2266.
161 See MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 13.
162 See id. Plaintiffs also used their brief in opposition to dismiss to once again
support their basic claim that the surveillance program, and the telecommunications
companies' involvement in the program, violated individuals' constitutional rights. Id at
8 ("Warrantless government surveillance not only violates the Fourth Amendment, it also
implicates First Amendment rights.").
163 Id. at 13.
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their viewpoints with a 1972 United States Supreme Court case holding that
the Fourth Amendment did not allow a decision such as warrantless
wiretapping to be left solely to the Executive. 164 Therefore, in order for there
to be constitutional accountability, there must be some way for people to take
judicial action in support of their constitutional rights.
B. Separation of Powers
Another potential argument against the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 is
that telecommunication immunity violates the separation of powers
doctrine.165 On a basic level, separation of powers requires that one branch of
government "cannot interfere with, or encroach on, or exercise the powers of,
either of the other[s]. ' ' 166 Cindy Cohn, legal director for the EFF, describes
the separation of powers argument against telecommunications immunity
law, stating, "If Congress can give the executive the power to exclude the
judiciary from considering the constitutional claims of millions of
Americans... then the judiciary will no longer be functioning as a coequal
branch of government."'167 As plaintiffs in the telecommunication immunity
litigation argue, FISAAA's grant of immunity potentially violates the
separation of powers on two levels: (1) taking lawmaking power from
Congress, and (2) taking the ability to determine facts from the court. 168
One separation of powers argument against telecommunication immunity
is that the law impermissibly delegates lawmaking power away from
Congress.169 Plaintiffs' counsel in the telecommunication case points to
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution to argue that "any change in
164 Id. at 7; United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)
("Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech from
unreasonable surveillance."). The Court in Keith did stress the narrowness of its Fourth
Amendment holding, refusing to question the appropriateness of surveillance legislation.
407 U.S. at 309.
165 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 13.
166 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 215 (2008). While the separation of powers
doctrine and the appropriate balance of power between branches are no doubt complex
constitutional issues, for the purposes of this Note, the basic inquiry is whether the
FISAAA causes one branch to encroach on the power of the others. As Part 1V.B will
demonstrate, plaintiffs are arguing that such encroachment is occurring in two forms.
167 Egelko, New Suit, supra note 16, at B3.
168 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 13.
169 MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 7; see Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1951) (setting forth the "nondelegation
doctrine," which states that Congress cannot delegate lawmaking power to the executive
branch).
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previously enacted law must be enacted by Congress."' 70 In support of this
line of argument, the plaintiffs challenging telecommunication immunity rely
heavily on Clinton v. City of New York. 171 The Clinton Court held that any
lawmaking power that allowed the Executive to negate laws for policy
reasons violated Article I, Section 7, regardless of congressional intention. 172
Despite this requirement of Congress, the FISA Amendment Act of 2008
leaves the decision of whether or not to give certification for immunity
entirely in the discretion of the Attorney General.1 73 Specifically, regarding
50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a, plaintiffs state:
Whether or not to file a certification is entirely within the Attorney
General's power. Even where one of the requirements of subsections (a)(l)-
(5) is satisfied, he has no duty to file a certification. If the Attorney General
does file a certification, then the law changes and section 802 governs the
action. If he does not file a certification, section 802 does not apply and the
law governing the action remains unchanged. 174
Therefore, the Attorney General's own discretion empowers him to
change the course of the law.175
Another potential separation of powers challenge to the FISAAA is that
the law strips the court system of the ability to make factual
determinations. 176 This argument is based on Article III of the Constitution,
170 MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 7; see also U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 7.
171 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 14; see Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417,438 (1998) (finding the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional because
"[t]here is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to
amend, or to repeal statutes").
172 524 U.S. at 445-46 ("The Line Item Veto Act authorizes the President himself to
effect the repeal of laws, for his own policy reasons, without observing the procedures set
out in Article I, § 7. The fact that Congress intended such a result is of no moment.").
173 MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 8.
174 Id. Peter Eliasberg of the ACLU summarized opponents' separation of powers
fears, stating "Courts must decide what materials can be kept from the public, not a
political appointee like the Attorney General, who may be more interested in protecting a
particular Administration than the public's right to know." Congress Cannot Grant
Wholesale Immunity to Telecoms; FISA 2008 Act is Unconstitutional, ACLU Tells Court,
COMMoNDREAMs.oRG, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/
2008/10/17.
175 MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 8; see 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(a)
(West 2008) (placing the decision of whether or not to provide certification within the
authority of the Attorney General).
176 See MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 20.
1240 [Vol. 70:5
TELECOMMUNICATION IMMUNITY
which grants judicial power.177 The Supreme Court defended Article 1H
power, holding in United States v. Klein that Congress may not "prescribe a
rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way."' 178 The plaintiffs argue
that neither Congress nor the Executive may force the Judiciary into making
a particular finding of fact. 179 FISAAA allegedly violates this principle
because 50 U.S.C. § 1885a gives the Attorney General the authority to
determine if the particular situation meets statutory requirements.180 The fear
is that if the Attorney General can force courts to dismiss actions without
judiciary fact-finding, the courts constitutional role, as well as the separation
of powers doctrine, will be threatened.'18
C. Due Process
A final constitutional argument that opponents of telecommunication
immunity have leveled against the FISAAA is that the amendment violates
due process. 182 On a fundamental level due process requires "government
action resulting in the deprivation of a liberty or property interest to be
implemented in a fair manner."1 83 This concept is embedded in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 184 The plaintiffs' argument rests on the notion that
when the Attorney General grants immunity, through FISAAA procedure,
the plaintiff "never receive[s] an adversary adjudication before an unbiased
177 U.S. CONST. art. III.
178 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871). The Court in Klein was
attempting to assess the rights of property holders who had been hostile to the United
States in the Civil War. Id. at 136.
179 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 20 ("The prohibition against
directing the courts to make particular findings of fact or particular applications of law to
fact applies equally to the Executive as it does to Congress.").
180 Id. at 21. Plaintiffs do concede that the Attorney General's decisions are subject
to judicial review under a substantial evidence standard. Id.; see also 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1885a(b)(1). Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argue that this requirement of appellate review
is not enough to meet constitutional standards. MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note
146, at 22.
181 See MDL Plaintiff's Opposition, supra note 146, at 21-22.
182 MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 16 ("Due process requires more
than what [50 U.S.C. § 1885a] provides."); see Egelko, New Suit, supra note 16, at B3
(quoting EFF legal director Cindy Cohn, "Due process requires more than the chance to
shadow-box with the government.").
183 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1505 (2008).
184 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.. ."). This notion is applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. amend. XIV.
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decisionmaker empowered to decide facts and law de novo .... ,,185 Similar
to the separation of powers challenge, the plaintiffs argue that for the
requirement of due process to be met, a court must be able to play a fact-
finding role and not simply review the Attorney General's decisions. 186
In order to assert their due process rights, the plaintiffs argue that the
causes of action against telecommunications carriers are property interests
protected under due process. 187 In support of this notion, plaintiffs cite
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., a Supreme Court case which states, "[A]
cause of action is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."' 188 In Logan, the Court found that a
plaintiff could have a property right in an employment claim.189
Telecommunication immunity plaintiffs use this precedent to conclude
"plaintiffs' constitutional claims, federal statutory claims, and state law
claims are all property interests protected by due process."'190 Following from
this conclusion is the inference that by granting telecommunications carriers
immunity, and thus dismissing the plaintiffs' cause of action, the government
is depriving the plaintiffs of a property interest without due process. 191
Finally, the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 also raises due process
concerns because of the potential harsh procedures surrounding case
dismissal.192 Opponents of the immunity legislation have been especially
critical of the procedure for disclosing and reviewing the information under
the Act.193 In particular, 50 U.S.C. § 1885a limits review of government
185 MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 16.
186Id. at 18. In their reply brief to the government and communications carriers'
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs offered harsh criticism of the defendants' characterizations
of the law. Id. ("The lulling assurances and artfully inaccurate descriptions deployed by
the government and the carriers cannot conceal that under [50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a] the
Court... is prohibited from independently determining the facts.").
187 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 22 ("Plaintiffs have a liberty
interest in their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and ... Plaintiffs cannot be deprived of these constitutional liberties without due
process.").
188 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (holding that an
employee had a right to an adjudicatory proceeding regarding a claim under the Fair
Employment Practice Act).
189 Id. at 429-30.
190 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 22.
191 See id. at 22.
192 MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 16 ("by limiting review of the
correctness of those findings to application of the deferential 'substantial evidence'
standard of review, [50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a] violates due process.").
193 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 27 ("The Attorney General has
invoked the secrecy provisions of [50 U.S.C.A § 1885a(c)] here, thereby seeking to have
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materials to an in camera ex parte setting if the Attorney General declares
that disclosure "would harm the national security of the United
States ... ."194 The argument follows that such procedure does not give the
plaintiff the fair opportunity to evaluate and rebut the government's dismissal
motion. 195 The plaintiffs cite a variety of Supreme Court cases, including
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, to support the concept that the plaintiff must receive
meaningful notice and information regarding the government's argument for
dismissal. 196
In summary, opponents of the telecommunication immunity amendment
to FISA have raised a variety of arguments. The plaintiffs in the
telecommunication litigation claim that the FISA Amendment Act of 2008
violates the Constitution on multiple grounds. 197 The basic attacks on the
Amendment are that it unconstitutionally (1) denies plaintiffs' First and
Fourth Amendment claims, (2) violates separation of powers, (3) and denies
due process.
V. TAKING A STAND: WHY TELECOMMUNICATIONS IMMUNITY IS
CONSTITUTIONAL
The opponents' arguments against telecommunication immunity and the
Amendment to FISA clearly raise various questions. Has Congress, by
granting immunity, given the Executive too much power, and in turn,
reduced accountability for the TSP? There is little doubt that FISAAA has
shifted the balance of power regarding telecommunication litigation toward
the Executive Branch. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that
telecommunication immunity is unconstitutional. Examining the arguments
of the government, telecommunication carriers, and applicable federal court
decisions sheds further light on the controversy. Additionally, Judge Walker
has recently issued an order for the Northern District of California dismissing
the telecommunications cases and finding the FISAAA constitutional. 198
the Court dismiss plaintiffs' actions while keeping secret from plaintiffs the supporting
factual basis and legal grounds for the certifications. These secrecy provisions violate due
process.").
194 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(c) (West 2008).
195 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 27.
196 Id. at 28; see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that an
"enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker").
197 MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at ii-iii.




Confronting such sources, as well as returning to the language of the
Amendment itself, ultimately leads to the conclusion that the FISA
Amendment Act of 2008 does not violate the Constitution, and accordingly,
the federal courts should dismiss the cases against the telecommunications
industry.
A. Denial of First and Fourth Amendment Claims
As noted above, one of the plaintiffs' primary challenges to FISAAA is
that in granting telecommunication immunity, Congress and the Attorney
General are denying the plaintiffs their First and Fourth Amendment
claims. 199 Such an argument, however, fails to differentiate between
available actions as a whole, and actions against a particular private
defendant.200 After viewing Supreme Court precedent, it is clear that
FISAAA merely limits, and does not deny, the First and Fourth Amendment
claims of potential plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress is allowed to limit remedies
regarding constitutional rights.201 For example, in Anniston the Court upheld
procedures (which allowed redress against the government and not a specific
state actor) placed on a taxpayers' attempt to challenge the constitutionality
of a tax statute.20 2 Additionally, in Bush v. Lucas, the Supreme Court made
clear that Congress has the ability, through statute, to adjust remedies of
constitutional violations. 20 3 The Court concluded in Bush, "When Congress
199 See supra Part V.A.
200 See Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants in Support of the United
States' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, In re Nat'l Sec.
Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW, (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 5,
2008) at 4-5 [hereinafter Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants] ("When, as
here, Congress merely limits remedies against particular private defendants alleged to
have participated in unconstitutional government action, there is no constitutional
problem."); Corrected United States' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, for Summary Judgment, In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig.,
No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2008) at 4 [hereinafter Corrected United
States' Reply] ("[50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a] ... merely precludes Plaintiffs from seeking
remedies for alleged constitutional violations from a certain group of private
entities....").
201 See Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 343 (1937) ("[S]ubstitution of an
exclusive remedy directly against the Government [for a constitutional claim against a
particular state actor] 'is not an invasion of [a] constitutional right."').
202 Id. at 342-43.
203 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983). The Court in Bush held that it would be inappropriate
for the Court to substitute a remedy for First Amendment claims when Congress had
already established procedure for granting remedy. Id. at 390.
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provides an alternative remedy, it may, of course, indicate its intent, by
statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the
statutory remedy itself, that the courts' power should not be exercised. '20 4
Because Congress has the right to limit remedies regarding constitutional
rights, the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 does not unconstitutionally deny
potential plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment claims. FISAAA grants
immunity from lawsuits to a specific set of potential private defendants.205
As required in Bush, Congress clearly expressed its intent, along with the
procedures that must be implemented, to grant telecommunications
companies immunity for their involvement in the TSP.206 Furthermore, as
both the government and telecommunications carriers point out, potential
relief has not been denied to the plaintiffs, as the plaintiffs have already filed
actions against the government for the same factual background. 207 Thus, all
the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 has done is to require plaintiffs to seek
redress from the government itself, something the Supreme Court has
consistently allowed Congress to do through lawmaking. 20 8
In response to the defendants' arguments regarding the First and Fourth
Amendment claims, plaintiffs argue that potential action against the
government is not enough to make FISAAA constitutional. 209 Plaintiffs
specifically claim that the action against the telecommunications carriers is
unique because it was their action, not the government's, which infringed on
customers' rights.210  Such an argument fails to recognize the
interdependency of the actions for which the plaintiffs seek remedy.
Telecommunications companies can only seek immunity for actions that they
204 Id. at 378.
205 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2008) (including those who assisted the
government in intelligence gathering "designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack" and
received certification from the Attorney General).
206 See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a.
207 Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra note 200, at 4
("Plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit seeking relief against government actors for alleged
constitutional violations .... Plaintiffs themselves represent that Jewel "raises identical
legal questions [as the cases against the carriers]"); Corrected United States' Reply, supra
note 200, at 4 ("Plaintiffs in several cases consolidated in this IMlDL proceeding have
sued Government defendants.").
208 See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378.
209 MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 5 ("Only relief against the
carriers can deter such future constitutional violations.").
2 10 Id. ("Plaintiffs' claims are aimed at what the carriers did, not at what the
government did.").
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performed at the behest of the government. 2 1' If such actions were not
directed by the government, they do not qualify under FISAAA. 212 Thus, to
claim that seeking relief from the government would not satisfy the unique
claim against telecommunications companies seems to ignore the clear
requirements for immunity.
Congress, through FISAAA, limited plaintiffs' potential relief from one
specific private group, and did not deny a constitutional claim. The plaintiffs
in the telecommunications litigation cases have already filed causes of action
against the government based on the same factual circumstances. 213
Therefore, in the area of First and Fourth Amendment claims, FISAAA
meets constitutional standards that the Supreme Court has provided.
B. Separation of Powers
Opponents of FISAAA also challenge the law's constitutionality on
separation of powers grounds.214 In particular, plaintiffs claim that FISAAA
violates separation of powers by shifting lawmaking powers from Congress
to the executive branch and by taking decision making power away from the
judicial branch.21 5 After examining Supreme Court precedent in combination
with the language and structure of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, these
claims prove unconvincing.
The FISA Amendment Act of 2008 does not give the Attorney General
law-making power.216 In order to grant telecommunication immunity to those
211 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(a)(4)(a) (West 2008) (stating that telecommunication
immunity is only allowed if action was taken "in connection with an intelligence activity
involving communications," and was "authorized by the President during the period
beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007.").
212 Id.
213 See Jewel v. NSA, et al., No. 08-cv-4373 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 18, 2008); see
also Jewel v. NSA, Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/cases/jewel ("In
Jewel v. NSA, EFF is suing the NSA and other government agencies on behalf of AT&T
customers to stop the illegal, unconstitutional, and ongoing dragnet surveillance of their
communications and communications records."). In Jewel, EFF is basing its claim on
documents that a former AT&T employer provided. Id. These documents reveal that
AT&T provided information to the NSA. Id. Importantly, EFF admits that the "same
evidence is central" to the claim against telecommunications companies. Id. Such an
admission casts doubt on the plaintiffs' contention that the two lawsuits are really dealing
with unique actions and separate harm.
2 14 See supra Part IV.B.
215 Id.
2 16 See Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra note 200, at 10-1I.
Counsel for the telecommunications carriers argues that under the FISA Amendment Act
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who assisted in the TSP, the Attorney General must certify that a number of
criteria are met. 217 Specifically, for the Attorney General to grant immunity,
assistance must have (1) taken place during the time frame of the terrorist
surveillance program, (2) been "designed to detect or prevent a terrorist
attack ... against the United States," and (3) been the "subject of a written
request or directive" from a high ranking intelligence community official.218
All of these factors lead to the conclusion that Congress intended not to give
lawmaking authority, but instead to allow the Attorney General to act under a
specific set of circumstances. 219
Supreme Court precedent also supports the power of Congress to enact
legislation such as FISAAA. 220 In claiming that the amendment violated
separation of powers, plaintiffs relied heavily on Clinton.22 1 Nevertheless,
the power conferred by the FISAAA is a long cry from the power of a line
item veto.222 The Supreme Court has allowed Congress to delegate various
types of decisions to administrative agencies. 223 As stated in Yakus v. United
States:
The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the
legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation.... These essentials
are preserved when Congress has specified the basic conditions of fact upon
whose existence or occurrence, ascertained ... a designated administrative
agency, it directs that its statutory command shall be effective. 224
of 2008 "the Attorney General plays a traditional executive role, not a legislative one."
Id. at 11.
217 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(a)(4) (West 2008).
2181Id.
219 Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants supra note 200, at 11
("Congress decided on and enacted the legal standards; the Attorney General is given the
power to make a factual demonstration to the courts when he believes the standards have
been satisfied.").
220 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424-25 (1944) (describing the
appropriate role of the legislature).
221 See supra Part IV.B.
222 See Corrected United States' Reply supra note 200, at 10-11 ("The Line Item
Veto Act gave the President 'unilateral power' to effectively eliminate provisions of
statutory law... [t]he Attorney General's role under the [FISA Amendment] is limited to
providing a certification setting forth a narrow set of facts necessary to implement a
policy decision already made by Congress.").
223 Id. at 11-12.
224 Yakus, 321 U.S. at 424-25 (holding that Congress had appropriately exercised its
legislative power in enacting the Emergency Price Control Act); see also J.W. Hampton,
Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay down by
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In passing the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, Congress was doing
nothing more than establishing "basic conditions of fact" by which the
Attorney General could grant immunity.
Furthermore, the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 does not
unconstitutionally remove decision making power from the judiciary.225
Plaintiffs' contention that FISAAA violates Article HI can be rejected in two
ways. First, Congress does not infringe on judicial fact-finding authority
when it amends a law on which a claim is based.226 Although the Supreme
Court did hold in Klein that Congress could not "prescribe a rule for the
decision of a cause in a particular way,"227 the Court has clarified this
holding.228 Specifically, the Court has allowed Congress to amend law that
influences a cause of action without infringing on judiciary function.229
Additionally, circuit courts have frequently held that separation of powers
analysis does not change simply because Congress creates a statutory defense
to litigation.230 By enacting FISAAA, Congress has simply amended FISA
law to create a statutory defense to a cause of action.231 Therefore, under
current precedent, this would not be enough to invoke Klein.232
legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such
rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of
legislative power."); Corrected United States' Reply, supra note 200, at 12.
225 See Corrected United States' Reply, supra note 200, at 6; Brief of
Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra note 200, at 14 ("Plaintiffs likewise err in
suggesting that [50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a] impinges on the judicial function by purportedly
forbidding 'the Court from engaging in independent fact-finding.').
226 Corrected United States' Reply, supra note 200, at 6 ("The Supreme Court has
repeatedly made clear that nothing in Article III forbids Congress from enacting new law
or amending the law applicable to a pending cause of action..
227 80 U.S. at 146.
228 Corrected United States' Reply supra note 200, at 6 ("The Supreme Court has
repeatedly made clear that nothing in Article III forbids Congress from enacting new law
or amending the law applicable to a pending cause of action, even if that action has been
resolved by a trial court and awaits a ruling by an appellate court.").
22 9 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (quoting Robertson
v. Seattle Audobon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) ("Whatever the precise scope of
Klein, however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold
when Congress 'amend[s] applicable law."'); Corrected United States' Reply, supra note
200, at 6.
230 Corrected United States' Reply, supra note 200, at 7 ("In numerous cases, the
courts have held that a change in applicable substantive law does not violate the
separation of powers even though Congress has affected an existing cause of
action . . ").
231 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2008).
232 Corrected United States' Reply, supra note 200, at 6.
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Second, the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 does allow for judicial
determination. 233 While the Attorney General makes the initial certification
choice, the courts must determine whether such certification is "supported by
substantial evidence provided to the court.. ."234 Opponents of
telecommunication immunity argue that the "substantial evidence" standard
is too weak to prevent the conclusion that FISA has stripped fact-finding
authority from the judiciary.235 Nevertheless, just because a standard is
deferential does not mean the courts have no fact-finding role.236 The
Supreme Court and the circuit courts have indicated that a separation of
powers problem only occurs when Congress has "left the court no
adjudicatory function to perform. '237 In the current situation, FISA does
leave the courts with an "adjudicatory function," although a deferential
one.
238
Based on the language of the FISA Amendment and the rulings of
federal courts, the contention that the statute violates separation of powers is
flawed. Congress is entitled to amend laws and influence causes of action,
and the statute does place the judiciary in a position of judicial review.239
Thus, after discarding separation of powers, the remaining plaintiff claim
against the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 rests on due process grounds.
C. Due Process
Opponents of telecommunication immunity also claim that the FISA
Amendment Act of 2008 violates due process. 240 In particular, the plaintiffs
argue that through telecommunication immunity they are being denied their
233 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(b) ("A certification under subsection (a) shall be given
effect unless the court finds that such certification is not supported by substantial
evidence provided to the court pursuant to this section.").
234 Id.
235 See MDL Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 146, at 22.
236 Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra note 200, at 14
("Plaintiffs ignore decades of law recognizing that courts perform a judicial function
when they review executive branch determinations under deferential standards.").
237 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 392-94 (1980) (holding
that Congress had not overstepped its legislative power in allowing the Court of Claims
jurisdiction over an Indian Claims Commission's decision); see also Brief of
Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra 200 note, at 15.
238 See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(b) (West 2008).
239 See id. § 1885a(b).
240 See supra Part IV.C; MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 16.
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property interest in a cause of action without the due process of law.241
Nevertheless, despite the potential surface appeal of the due process
arguments of the plaintiffs, 242 the due process challenge is ultimately
misleading. Turning to Supreme Court precedent, as well as focusing on the
language and requirements of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, dispels any
due process concerns.
First, it is important to note that due process is a flexible doctrine and not
a rigid standard.243 The telecommunications litigation plaintiffs assert the
claim that due process requires an "impartial adjudicator" who can review
the evidence and then "decide all the facts and law relevant to the deprivation
of their property interests. ' 244 Nevertheless, in applying such a standard to
telecommunication immunity, the plaintiffs underestimate the flexibility of
due process. 245 As recently as 2005, the Supreme Court, in finding that an
Ohio prison classification system provided sufficient process, emphasized
that "the requirements of due process are flexible and call for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands. '246 Thus, in
applying due process, the Court has avoided laying out any rigid set of rule
for its evaluations. 247
The FISA Amendment Act of 2008 does contain the procedural
protections that due process requires.248 As noted above, in order to obtain
241 MDL Plaintiffs Opposition, supra note 146, at 22 ("Plaintiffs have a liberty
interest in their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches
and .... [p]laintiffs cannot be deprived of these constitutional liberties without due
process."); see also supra Part IV.C.
242 See MDL Plaintiffs' Reply Briefs, supra note 147, at 16; MDL Plaintiff's
Opposition, supra note 146, at 22.
243 See Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra note 200, at 16
("Plaintiffs are receiving all that due process requires-'a hearing before an impartial
adjudicator empowered to receive evidence and argument and to decide all the facts and
law relevant to' their claims.").
244 MDL Plaintiff's Opposition, supra note 146, at 23.
245 See Corrected United States' Reply, supra note 200, at 16 (arguing through
application of Supreme Court precedent that "[tihe requirements of due process are
'flexible'); see also Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra note 200, at
17.
246 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (internal citation omitted); see
also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often by this
Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.").
247 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224.
248 See Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra note 200, at 17
("Although [telecommunication immunity] provides for some deference to the Executive,
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telecommunication immunity, an attorney general must provide certification
that undergoes a process of judicial review.249 Under FISAAA, the district
court will not give immunity effect unless the certification is "supported by
substantial evidence provided to the court pursuant to this section." 250 Such a
standard is no doubt deferential to the Attorney General's decision, but it still
provides an opportunity for an unbiased review and decision-making
process. 251 As was the case in addressing separation of powers, 252 the
Supreme Court has allowed deferential standards, such as substantial
evidence. 253 Furthermore, in areas involving national security, courts have
been increasingly willing to find deferential standards to be appropriate.
254
Finally, even if the rationale behind plaintiffs' due process claim had
greater merit, the property interest argument of the plaintiffs is highly
questionable.255 Recall that the plaintiffs claimed that their cause of action
the statute permits the Court to make a meaningful, independent assessment of the facts
at issue.")
249 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(b) (West 2008).
250 Id. In essence the plaintiffs' due process argument is similar to the separation of
powers claim. Both arguments are trying to say that the substantial evidence standard is
too deferential and should be replaced with de novo review. See Corrected United States'
Reply, supra note 200, at 16 ("Plaintiffs' due process argument boils down to an
objection to the substantial evidence standard .... [T]his objection is largely a reprise of
Plaintiffs' separation of powers challenge. .. ."); Brief of Telecommunications Carrier
Defendants, supra note 200, at 16 ("Plaintiffs' complaint reduces to the claim that [50
U.S.C.A. § 1885a's] 'substantial evidence' standard is unconstitutional.").
251 Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants, supra note 200, at 17 ("[I]t is
this Court, not the Attorney General, that adjudicates whether the requirements ... are
met."). Senator Rockefeller, on the Senate floor, made clear that in passing the FISA
Amendment Act, Congress was reserving the courts an "important role in determining
whether statutory requirements for liability protection have been met." 154 CONG. REC.
S6383 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
252 See supra Part V.B.
253 See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (exploring the
legislative intent and judicial approach to a substantial evidence standard with regard to a
Social Security claim).
254 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir. 2007)
(emphasizing, in evaluating a TSP claim, that courts "need to defer to the Executive on
matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find
ourselves second guessing the Executive"); see also Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Brief of Telecommunications Carrier Defendants,
supra note 200, at 18. Based on this general deference, plaintiffs' due process arguments
regarding ex parte in camera proceedings are also unavailing because of the potential
sensitive nature of classified information in question. See 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(c) (West
2008).
255 Corrected United States' Reply, supra note 200, at 13.
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was a property interest, based on the notion from Logan that a "cause of
action is a species of property. '256 Such an assessment, however, fails to
acknowledge the narrowness of Logan. Specifically, Logan noted that
government, consistent with the due process clause, "remains free to create
substantive defenses or immunities for use in adjudication or to eliminate its
statutorily created causes of action altogether. '257 In this case, what Congress
did was create a statutory defense to a cause of action.258 Thus, under Logan,
one could argue that while a property right interest may have been taken
from the plaintiffs, it was not in violation of due process. 259
Federal court precedent, along with the arguments of the government and
telecommunication defendants, displays that FISAAA is constitutional.
Plaintiffs' arguments ultimately fail for a number of reasons. Among these
reasons are Congress's ability to limit causes of action and the FISA
Amendment's process for judicial review of the Attorney General's
certification decision. Therefore, the federal court system should dismiss the
current lawsuits against telecommunications companies because of the
requirements of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008.
D. Judge Walker's Order
On June 3, 2009 the federal court system took its first major stride in
deciding the constitutionality of FISAAA. 260 Judge Walker, writing for the
Northern District of California, issued an order dismissing the lawsuits
against the telecommunications companies that assisted in the TSP.261 In
doing so, Judge Walker went through the plaintiffs' various constitutional
challenges to FISAAA and ultimately held that the legislation was
constitutional. 262
The court swiftly rejected the plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment
arguments. 263 In finding the plaintiffs' arguments unavailing, the order
focused on the narrow "focused immunity" that Congress granted in the
2 56 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,428 (1982).
257 Id. at 432.
258 Furthermore, as addressed earlier in Part V.A, plaintiffs remain free to seek a
cause of action against the government for the actions of the TSP.
259 Corrected United States' Reply, supra note 200, at 13-14.
260 EFF and ACLU Planning to Appeal, supra note 61.
261 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
262 Id. at 960-75. Judge Walker also rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the Attorney
General's certification, which led to the government's motion to dismiss, was inadequate.
Id. at 975-76.
263 Id. at 961 ("The court finds no merit in this argument.").
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FISAAA. 264 The court stated that Congress acted without "interpret[ing] the
Constitution or affect[ing] plaintiffs' underlying constitutional rights. '265 The
court further determined the plaintiffs' argument to be an overreaction
because of the confined scope of FISAAA. 266 Specifically, the court cited
section 802(a)(4) to note that immunity is not available for actions authorized
by the President after January 17, 2007.267
The court found the separation of powers arguments to be the closest
issues that the case presented. 268 Judge Walker first addressed the issue,
under Klein, of whether through telecommunication immunity Congress
impermissibly forced the judiciary to make factual determinations in a
particular manner.269 After reviewing Klein and its progeny, the court
decided that the ultimate issue was whether Congress had really directed
factual findings or simply "changed the underlying law."'270 Ultimately, the
court determined the latter to be the case, stating, "Congress created a new,
narrowly-drawn and 'focused' immunity within FISA, thus changing the
underlying law in a 'detectable way.' 271 Therefore, the order held there was
no separation of powers violation under Klein.272
The Northern District of California also addressed the non-delegation
component of plaintiffs' separation of powers challenge. 273 In reviewing this
issue, Judge Walker described a delicate balance. On the one hand, the court
noted that FISAAA established a system of immunity that did not establish a
clear basis "for [the Attorney General's] exercise of discretion. 274
Nevertheless, the court also recognized that congressional delegations of
2 64 Id. On a related note, even the EFF recognized in their press release following
Judge Walker's order that opponents retained the ability to challenge FISA even in the
face of telecommunication immunity. EFF and ACLU Planning to Appeal, supra note 61.
Specifically, the EFF announced, "Judge Walker left the door open to accountability for
the government, holding that 'plaintiffs retain a means of redressing the harms alleged in
their complaints by proceeding against government actors."' Id.
265 In re Nat'l See. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 961.
2 66 Id.
267 Id.; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(a)(4) (West 2008).
268 See In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 970-
71.
269 Id. at 961-64 (citing Klein, 80 U.S. at 146).
270 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 963.
271 Id. at 964 (internal citations omitted).
272 Id.
273 Id. Judge Walker specifically mentioned that the issue of non-delegation of
lawmaking authority was "the most serious of plaintiff's challenges." Id.
274 Id.
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authority to administrative agencies are common.275 Ultimately, the order
held that § 802 of FISAAA did not violate the Constitution. 276 Once again,
the court focused on the narrow nature of the immunity, stating, "Section 802
is not a broad delegation of authority to an administrative agency... rather,
its subject matter is intentionally narrow or 'focused' in scope. 277
Finally, Judge Walker's order rejected any potential due process
challenges to FISAAA.278 The court held that plaintiffs' argument that they
were being denied a property interest without due process of law was
"without merit. '279 Specifically, the court stressed that under FISAAA "[t]he
Attorney General, in submitting the certifications, is acting pursuant to and in
accordance with that congressional grant of authority, in effect, to administer
the newly-created immunity provision. '280 Citing Logan, the order held that
Congress had authority to provide a defense to a statutory cause of action,
and that in choosing to provide such a defense with FISAAA, the
requirements of due process were satisfied.281 The court also rejected any
claim that secrecy provisions within FISAAA, allowing for in camera and ex
parte review of evidence, violates due process. 282 The court noted, "Given
the special balancing that must take place when classified information is
involved in a proceeding, the court is not prepared to hold that the
Constitution requires more process than section 802 provides in the
circumstances of this case." 283
Accordingly, the United States Court for the Northern District of
California held that the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 was constitutional and
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the telecommunication immunity
suits.284 Nevertheless, Judge Walker's order will not be the final say on the
constitutionality of FISAAA. Both the EFF and ACLU have already made
275 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 964.
276 Id. at 970-71.
277 Id. at 970.
278 Id. at 972.
279 Id. at 971.
280 Id.
281 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 971
(citing Logan, 455 U.S. at 435 (holding that when Congress chooses to provide an
immunity defense it is "the legislative determination [that] provides all the process that is
due")).
282 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 972; see
also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a(c) (West 2008).
283 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
284 I. at 976 ("For the aforestated reasons, the United States' motion to dismiss
(Doc. # 469) [is granted].").
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clear their intentions to appeal Judge Walker's decision to the Ninth
Circuit.285 Thus, the federal court battle over FISAAA's constitutionality has
only just begun.
VI. WHERE TO GO FROM HERE
Regardless of what the federal courts ultimately decide regarding the
constitutionality of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008,286 an obvious
question remains: what is next? If the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 is
found unconstitutional, the litigation against telecommunications carriers will
continue, and the other two branches of the federal government will have to
decide whether to respond.287 In the more likely event that FISAAA is
upheld,288 opponents of the TSP will still have claims to pursue against the
government in seeking redress.289 Nevertheless, the window for judicial
285 On the day Judge Walker made the order public, EFF issued a press release
stating its intentions to appeal the decision. EFF and ACLU Planning to Appeal, supra
note 61. Cindy Cohn, legal director of EFF, expressed disappointment with the ruling,
and reaffirmed her belief in the plaintiffs basic arguments, stating, "The retroactive
immunity law unconstitutionally takes away Americans' claims arising out of the First
and Fourth Amendments, violates the federal government's separation of powers as
established in the Constitution, and robs innocent telecom customers of their rights
without due process of law." Id.
286 At the time of this Note, EFF and the ACLU are beginning the process of
appealing Judge Walker's order to the Ninth Circuit. Id. Kurt Opsahl, the Senior Staff
Attorney for EFF, has already expressed hope that the Ninth Circuit will "stand up for the
Constitution, and reverse [Judge Walker's] decision." Id.
287 Presuming the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 is unconstitutional, it is unclear
how Congress or the Obama Administration would respond. While Congress ultimately
did support the bill, the Democratic Party was split in responding to pressure from the
Bush Administration. See supra Part III. Because President Obama was reluctant in
ultimately supporting the bill, observers might not expect the current administration to
push for revised telecommunication immunity law. See Risen, supra note 12.
Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has recently publicly supported
telecommunication immunity, asking Judge Walker to uphold the FISA Amendment Act
of 2008 and dismiss the lawsuits. Bob Egelko, Obama Administration Backs
Telecommunication Immunity, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2009, at B8 ("The Obama
administration has asked a federal judge in San Francisco to uphold a law aimed at
dismissing suits against telecommunications companies that cooperated with President
George W. Bush's wiretapping program."). While beyond the scope of this Note, one
must also wonder whether, under the current economic climate, the government would be
willing to expose the telecommunication industry to the potential liability that this series
of civil suits could entail.
288 See supra Part V.
289 See, e.g., Jewel v. NSA, No. 08-cv-4373 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2008) (civil
liberties claim against the government for the actions of the TSP).
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action against the telecommunications companies will close, unless
opponents of the TSP can convince Congress to change its legislation.
Perhaps, however, the more interesting inquiry is what should be next.
To this normative question, I respond with a simple suggestion: nothing. In
other words, the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 provides a moment for each
side of the debate to reflect rather than react. Such a response would no doubt
anger many, especially those who believe that the government and its helpers
should be held responsible for the surveillance actions they took following
September 11.290 Nevertheless, such anger would be short sighted and fail to
take into account what has truly occurred in the wiretapping controversy to
this point. Specifically, each side of the battle has victories to be proud of
and can look positively at the FISA Amendment Act of 2008.
Looking back upon the TSP and the events that led to the program,
supporters of the TSP and telecommunication immunity have obvious
reasons to celebrate the passage of FISAAA. After the events of September
11, 2001, President Bush made national security a primary focus of his
administration.291 President Bush himself admitted this was his justification
for authorizing the surveillance program.292 Once the media discovered the
TSP and the assistance telecommunications companies provided, President
Bush made it a priority to support electronic surveillance law that included
telecommunication immunity. 293 After a long struggle with Congress, the
Bush Administration was able to convince Congress to update FISA law and
grant immunity to telecommunications companies that had assisted the
government.294 Thus, in the minds of many people, the FISA Amendment
290 Opponents of telecommunication immunity were highly outspoken in their
negative reaction to the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, seeing the bill's passage as an
injustice. See, e.g., House Caves, Approves Fake 'Compromise' on Telecom Immunity:
EFF Condemns House Vote, Looks to Senate for Leadership, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, June 20, 2008, http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2008/06/20 ("Privacy
rights and the rule of law took a serious blow today when the House of Representatives
passed blanket retroactive immunity for phone companies that participated in the
president's warrantless surveillance program.").
291 See Bush, President Radio Address, supra note 25.
292 Id. ("In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation, I authorized the
National Security Agency ... to intercept the international communications of people
with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations.... This is a highly
classified program that is crucial to our national security. Its purpose is to detect and
prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, our friends and allies.").
293 See supra Part II.B. 1; see also Bush Pushes for Telecom Immunity, supra note
94.
294 See supra Part m1.
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Act of 2008 was one last win for President Bush in the fight for national
security.295
From a broader, forward-looking perspective, however, opponents of the
TSP and telecommunication immunity appear to be the true victors. From the
time of its exposure, opponents of the TSP have expressed outrage at its
existence.296 The most avid opponents may not be satisfied until there are
ramifications for everyone involved, including the telecommunications
companies.297 Moving away from the extremes, however, three specific
developments should provide opponents of the TSP and telecommunication
immunity with a sense of victory and hope for the future: (1) the termination
of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, (2) a president more sympathetic to
civil liberties, and (3) the compromise provisions within the FISA
Amendment Act of 2008.
First and foremost, the Terrorist Surveillance Program is no longer in
existence. In response to media scrutiny and public pressure the Bush
Administration disbanded the TSP, and the government has not reauthorized
the program since January of 2007.298 Thus, much like the warrantless
wiretapping of Presidents Richard Nixon and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the
warrantless wiretapping of the Bush Administration has been relegated to
history. Although the Bush Administration did not admit fault in terminating
the program, the practical reality (the program's end) remains the same.299
Despite negative reactions to President Bush's approach in terminating the
program, opponents of the program still celebrated its demise. 300
Second, opponents of warrantless surveillance and telecommunication
immunity now have a more sympathetic White House.30 1 While it is true that
295 This was the version of the story that Eric Lichtblau of the New York Times told
upon the Amendment's passing. See Lichtblau & Stout, supra note 72.
296 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 24, at A8 ("Congressional Democrats and some
Republicans have expressed outrage at the NSA program, saying it contradicts long-
standing restrictions on domestic spying and subverts constitutional guarantees.").
297 See, e.g., NSA Spying, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
http://www.eff.org/issues/nsa-spying (describing how EFF is currently suing both the
government and telecommunications companies involved in the TSP, and wants to "hold
the government officials behind the program accountable.").
298 See Gonzales Letter, supra note 2.
299 Id.
300 See, e.g., Editorial, A Spy Program in From the Cold, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 2007,
at A26 ("It was good news, then, when the administration announced yesterday that it
would now seek a warrant from the proper court for that sort of eavesdropping.").
301 In the early days of his presidency, President Obama's policies and decisions
have garnered mixed reactions from civil liberties organizations. For example, in January,
President Obama fulfilled his campaign promise to close Guantanamo Bay, receiving
praise from civil liberties organizations. President Obama Orders Guantanamo Bay
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many opponents of telecommunication immunity criticized President Obama
for his ultimate support of the FISA Amendment,30 2 Obama is still more
likely to be sympathetic to civil liberty concerns in making national security
decisions than the past administration. After all, a common message from
President Obama, during both his campaign and early in his presidency, has
been to "reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals." 30 3
Thus, at least in the short term, any return to TSP type surveillance is highly
improbable.
Finally, opponents of telecommunication immunity should still embrace
the compromise portions within the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
2008. Although the Amendment did create telecommunication immunity, it
also created a revised FISA system that increases congressional oversight
and once again requires Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts to review
government actions.304 Furthermore, FISAAA of 2008 explicitly declares
that FISA law is the "exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and
the interception of domestic wire, oral, or electronic communications may be
conducted. '30 5 This provision removes any ambiguity as to the lawfulness of
Closed and End to Torture, ACLU, Jan. 22, 2009, http://72.3.233.244/
safefree/detention/38455prs20090122.html (Caroline Fredrickson of the ACLU stated
"President Obama has given America a much-needed and significant break from the Bush
administration."). On the other hand, civil liberties groups still want President Obama to
release more Bush Administration secrets to the public. See Justice Department Releases
Bush Administration National Security Memos, ACLU, Mar. 2, 2009,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/38891prs20090302.html. Nevertheless, from the
perspective of civil liberties organizations, it seems obvious that President Obama is
preferred to his predecessor.
302 See Risen, supra note 12, at A14.
303 President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) (transcript available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address).
304 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendment Act of 2008, Pub.
L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801) (providing procedures for
both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Congress to provide checks on
electronic surveillance). Senator Rockefeller stressed that the FISA Amendment Act
provides the "district court both an important role in determining whether statutory
requirements for liability protection have been met and the tools to make that
assessment," and also requires "a report of the review be submitted to the Congress." 154
CONG. REc. S6383-S6384 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
305 50 U.S.C.A. § 1812. While the issue of telecommunications immunity
overshadowed the exclusivity provision within the FISA Amendment, members of
Congress saw the exclusivity provision as an important compromise. See Lichtblau &
Stout, supra note 72. As Speaker of the House Pelosi commented, the exclusivity
provision was an important part of the FISAAA because it states "that the law is the
exclusive authority and not the whim of the president of the United States." Id.
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future warrantless wiretapping. 30 6 As Senator Rockefeller stated to the
Senate:
[T]he bill tightens the exclusivity of the FISA law, making it
improbable for any future President to argue that acting outside of FISA is
lawful. That is huge. That means the President can never again, ever use
what he has used-his all-purpose powers-and say he can just walk right
around the end of FISA. 307
Thus, barring any change in law, all future electronic surveillance that
the Executive branch conducts must undergo the judicial and congressional
review that the new FISA law requires.
Neither the Terrorist Surveillance Program nor telecommunication
immunity will be the last major battle over electronic surveillance. After all,
in implementing the TSP, President Bush was only continuing a tradition of
electronic surveillance that began approximately fifty years earlier.30 8 With
technology constantly advancing, and terrorism still an ever-present threat,
there is little doubt that the delicate balance between liberty and security will
be tested in the future. Nevertheless, the FISA Amendment Act of 2008
provides a moment to pause for reflection. It presents the rare opportunity for
each side of the equation to have some sense of victory, while waiting for
future battles to begin.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the New York Times uncovered the Terrorist Surveillance
Program in December of 2005, the program has been a magnet for
controversy. An offshoot of this controversy has been the realization that
telecommunications companies played an active role in assisting the
government. With civil liberties organizations challenging the actions of
telecommunications companies in federal court, President Bush began
pressuring Congress to pass reformed FISA law that granted immunity to the
telecommunications companies that assisted in the program. Although
Congress resisted, it eventually passed the FISA Amendment Act of 2008,
which included telecommunication immunity.
It is currently up to the judiciary to decide whether the FISA Amendment
Act of 2008 violates the Constitution. Plaintiffs in the telecommunication
lawsuits challenge that the Act inappropriately denies them their First and
Fourth Amendment claims, violates separation of powers, and denies them
306 See id.
307 154 CONG. REC. S6383 (daily ed. July 8, 2008) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller).
308 See supra Part III.A.
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